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If space had permitted, I should have liked to have added some further criticism of what seems to me to be the loose way in which Professor Watson allows himself to use such words as 'possible,' 'inseparable,' 'independent,' 'necessary,' 'real,' 'true,' 'accidental,' etc. But the fatal objection to his philosophical thinking seems to me to be his failure to grasp the meaning of law and causality. Confusion over these has been a stumbling block for philosophy for a very long time; it is a most troublesome problem, and greatly aggravated by the thought which has already been bestowed upon it, but the chief light which the present book throws upon it is as an illustration of the fatal effects of failure to disentangle it.

I am well aware of the superficiality of criticism which destroys without any attempt at building up again, but this is hardly the place to enter upon such an undertaking even if I were qualified to attempt it. The problem which Professor Watson attacks is, I think, one of growing interest to people at the present time, and, though I cannot pretend myself to feel satisfied with the solution which he offers, I am sure that this book will be of interest to all whose minds are occupied with the effort to find some rational justification for faith.

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London, England.

THE BEYOND THAT IS WITHIN. By E. Boutroux. Translated by Jonathan Nield. London: Duckworth & Co., 1912. Pp. xiv, 138.

This little volume contains, besides the essay which gives its title to the work, translations of two addresses by M. Boutroux, one on "Morality and Religion," the other, delivered before the Bologna Congress of 1911, on the "Relation of Philosophy to the Sciences." All are pleasantly written and exhibit a sane and wholesome, if not a particularly profound, strain of thought. Of the three the title-essay is, in the present writer's opinion, the least striking. With its general thesis that, whereas positive science, concerning itself with the relations to be discovered among phenomena, never arrives at a true Infinite, such an Infinite is actually found in the inner life of the soul as it manifests itself in Art and Religion I find myself wholly in sympathy. And every now and then one has the pleasure of

finding here, as is usual in M. Boutroux's work, a singularly happy epigrammatic formulation of some of those truths about life which the one-sided intellectualism of positive science is always trying to ignore. Thus, *e. g.*, p. 17, "those who take for their motto: *ab actu ad posse* are the men who show themselves able," or again, p. 25, "while nature says: *nemo ultra posse tenetur*, the maxim of religion is: you ought, therefore you can." This is perhaps not exactly pragmatist philosophy; for it can be held in entire independence of the peculiarly pragmatist theory of truth. But it is, perhaps, something better, ripe and wholesome *Lebensweisheit*.

Yet I should not like to support all M. Boutroux's arguments in favor of the view that study of the connections in the phenomenal always leads to the indefinite regress. *E. g.*, we are told at p. 5 that "one moment A is only given in connection with an anterior moment B and a posterior moment C and so to infinity." It seems to be inferred from this that we cannot *think* of a first or a last moment of time, that we can only think of time as indefinitely stretching in two directions. I confess that the consequence is not clear to me. I do not see how to infer from the fact that the moments of my life have each a moment before and a moment after them the conclusion that there can be no moment with no antecedent, and no moment with no sequent. So the statement that "any number whatsoever allows (is this a mistranslation?) at once the entire sequence of numbers" is a little dubious. The illustration given (4 is 3+1 and it is also 5—1) suggests that 'number' is taken to mean 'natural integer.' But there is certainly a first term of the series of integers, which has no "number that precedes it." If 'number' means 'real number,' there is the fuller difficulty that not only is there a *first* real number (*viz.*, 0), but that no real number has an immediate successor, just as no mathematical moment of time has a next adjacent moment.

With the main argument of the second essay, that faith, hope, and love as relations to the hyper-phenomenal lie at the root alike of living religion and living morality, and that morality is consequently not destined at some future date to expel her natural ally, religion, from human life, it would be hard to disagree. I recommend the study heartily as a reply to those theorists, more common on the continent of Europe than among ourselves, who can see nothing in the great his-

torical religions but enemies from whom morality must 'emancipate' herself.

The third essay is the only one of which the French is known to me. It is an able defense of the claims of philosophy to have a perennial value against those who urge that her work, valuable enough in earlier days, is now definitely superseded by that of positive science. The main line of argument is that the positive sciences, from their own nature, can aim only at harmonizing and connecting the data of man's observed world. The task of harmonizing the observing and striking subject himself with the observed world, always remains over when science has done her work, and it is this harmonization of the sciences with life which is the function of philosophy.

A word on the translation. I have only been able to compare it with the original, as I have said, in the case of the third essay. There are certain obscurities in the former two which I suspect to arise from imperfect rendering. I have given one example already. In the third essay the author's drift is correctly preserved, but the elegance of his style has suffered badly at times from the translator's habit of toning down or replacing striking and opposite metaphors, and in one or two places the sense is perverted by actual mistranslation. I may note that '*actuel, actuellement*' are made to lose their force by such renderings as 'real.' M. Boutroux says, in his opening sentence, that the question of the relation of philosophy to the sciences is not modern only, but *actuel*. This does not mean merely 'real,' but 'living,' apposite to the present day. So (p. 112) when M. Boutroux says that in this scientific age philosophy is *actuellement* reviving, he means something more than 'actually'; he would say that philosophy is *at this very moment* reviving. The standing translation of *biais* by 'bias' is unfortunate, as the English word implies, what the French word does not, a prejudiced and inaccurate point of view. Again I feel pretty sure that on the several occasions on which reference is made to the *objects* of philosophy, the meaning is not, as Mr. Nield supposes, the *aims* of the study, but the *objects* which it investigates. When (p. 107) M. Boutroux deprecates treating philosophy itself as a collection of positive sciences, urging that 'philosophy' as a mere collective name for 'scientific' psychology, 'scientific' ethics, and the like, would have little more than a *valeur d'étiquette*, it is a pity to replace the metaphor "would

have little more value than a label" by the tame expression, "would have little more than a formal value," whatever that means. (I fear the translator took *valeur d'étiquette* to mean something connected with etiquette in our English sense of the word.) A similar error spoils a piquant metaphor on p. 113. The author observes that he does not propose to argue directly for the legitimacy of philosophical studies without any reference to the achievements of positive science, but rather to show by an examination the conditions of scientific investigation themselves that science presupposes postulates which can only be justified by an appeal to something other than positive science. If we examine the claims of philosophy, without starting with such a consideration of the character of the sciences, we shall expose ourselves to the objection *dite de la question préalable*. This is, of course, a metaphor from parliamentary procedure, meaning "the objection known as the 'previous question.'" The meaning is that it would be open to opponents to "move the previous question," *i. e.*, to decline to consider our argument altogether. Mr. Nield renders "the above-mentioned objection of a preliminary question," thus mistranslating the word *dite* and making the point of the sentence barely intelligible. An instance or two of sporadic and pure blunders. M. Boutroux does not say (p. 104) that Comte's view of the place of philosophy "seems fairly adequate." His whole point is that Comte's view is *not* adequate. What he says is that it *seems* so, *à beaucoup*, *i. e.*, "to many persons." Nor does he say (p. 128) of art, morals, and religion, that they "depend not only on external reality, but also on the kind of existence and on the value that pertain to them." What he does say is that reason seeks to discern and define the relation which connects with given and visible reality these three specifically human worlds of which eternal reality is merely the prop, and likewise (to discover and define) the kind of existence and the value which pertain to them." Mr. Nield has hopelessly missed both the grammar and the sense of the sentence. I could quote other instances of equally bad renderings, but those given are enough to show that M. Boutroux has expressed himself far too highly about the merits of his translator in the opening words of his "Author's Preface." I regret that more care has not been given to the correct printing of Greek citations.